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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims at analysing the methodology used for financing large infrastructure projects 
in Italy. In particular, it focuses on the Italian highway sector, where in the last years many 
projects have been launched using new financial instruments.  
The paper discusses three of these “instruments”. The first one is the Project Financing, 
discussed starting from a general review, analyzing also the different typologies used, the 
risks  involved  and  their  allocation  among  the  various  subjects  that  take  part  in  the  PF 
mechanism.  A  special  case  concerns  the  recently  introduced  model  used  for  the  Italian 
highways, known as “PF with takeover compensation”. 
There are two other important mechanisms used for financing infrastructure projects in Italy: 
the exploitation of road demand rigidity and the spreading of the investment over the entire 
network, favouring larger concessions.  
We conclude that all these three mechanisms present deep flaws in terms of transparency 
and  of  contradiction  with  economic  feasibility  criteria  (that  have  to  dominate  the  public 
investment rationale). 
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1. FINANCING TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURES 
Over the last decades the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) schemes for financing 
infrastructure projects in Europe has increased constantly (EC, 2009; Estache et al, 2007). 
PPPs and PFs in particular are mainly used because they allow the construction of new 
facilities within a context of tight government budget thanks to private financial intervention. 
In addition, the public administration can take advantage of the capacity of the private sector 
to increase efficiency (EC, 2009), while maintaining some prerogatives regarding direction, 
programming, control and regulation (Debande, 2002).  
Project Financing represents a specific instrument for the cooperation between public and 
private; the main characteristic of PF is that the financing of a new project is evaluated on the 
basis of its capacity to generate  cash flow that is the main source for the  repayment of 
financial debt and for the reimbursement of the shareholders’ equity.  
However, PPPs and PFs in particular encountered a good success among decision makers 
also for the use of PPPs to “bypass spending controls and to move public investment off 
budget and debt off the government balance sheet” (Schwartz et al, 2006). In order to avoid 
this distorted usage of PPPs the government has to analyze carefully all the risks associated 
with this tool and ensure that they are assigned to the stakeholder best capable to manage 
them.   
Within the context of PF, risk allocation represents the most critical issue since the wrong 
allocation compromises the final result. Considering the highways sector, three are the main 
risks to be considered: political risk, construction risk and commercial risk. For the first two 
risks, it is clear which is the stakeholder that can better control them. Conversely, traffic risk 
can be attributed both to the public and private partner because does not have a privileged 
stakeholder (Vassallo, 2005). In fact, it is not always true that the private concessionaire can 
control  this  kind  of  risk  since  traffic  demand  depends  from  many  different  variables 
(macroeconomic conditions, gasoline price, competition from other modes or facilities, etc) 
over which the private subject has little or no control. On the other hand assigning this risk to 
the public administration distorts the usage of PF leading to a standard construction contract.  
Risk allocation must also consider that there is information asymmetry (Laffont and Tirole, 
1993) between the concessionaire and the government that can lead the public to assume 
some risks that it is not able to manage (de Palma et al., 2007; Cappiello, 1996); for this 
reason the public decision-maker has to be strong and have competence and expertise in 
order  to  manage  technically,  legally  and  economically  the  discussion  with  the  private 
subjects. 
According to the specificities of the project in terms of revenues and costs, there are different 
types of PF : 
1.  the “hot project financing”, where the project is paid directly by the users’ revenues; 
2.  the “cold project financing”, where financial intervention of  public administration  is 
needed; 
In the first case, the potential cash flow deriving from tolls applied on the infrastructure are 
such to cover all the costs (construction and maintenance) plus the return on capital. The Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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latter case is typical of projects that doesn’t repay the total investment and maintenance 
costs with users’ revenues; so, a form of public administration repayment is needed in form 
of subsidies, fees and/or shadow tolls. 
 
The theoretical aspects introduced above does not represent the way PPP is used in the 
financing of Italian transport infrastructures, and of highways in particular. Highways should 
be  considered  as  potential  applications  of  “hot”  project  financing  schemes,  because 
sustainable toll revenues are usually above the operating costs and thus allow to repay the 
investments  (case  1,  Figure  1).  However  the  most  recent  projects,  due  both  to  rise  in 
construction costs and marginality of the missing network with respect to the existing main 
routes, show a lower capability of self-financing with revenues. Current projects are then not 
completely “hot”, needing public support to cover substantial shares of total investment (case 
2, Figure 1).  
 
PPP PPP











Figure 1. From “hot” PPP to “colder” schemes 
This paper will focus on further “degenerations” of the pure PPP scheme applied to highway 
financing  in  Italy.  Firstly  (in  the  following  section  2)  we  will  discuss  how  the  concept  of 
“takeover  compensation”  (case  3,  Figure  1),  in  itself  not  modifying  the  essence  of  PPP 
principles,  has  been  used  in  new  projects  making  financially  viable  virtually  any  project. 
Secondly  (case  4,  Figure  1),  we  will  discuss  two  further  peculiarities of  Italian  highways 
regulation,  both  artificially  increasing  the  revenues  of  a  weak  project  in  order  to  make  it 
financially viable: exploiting the rigidity of demand, for example by closing alternative routes 
to shift traffic from existing non tolled roads to the new one (section 3), and the practice used 
by  larger  concessionaires  to  cross-subsidise  new  projects  with  the  rest  of  the  network 
(section 4). Finally, conclusions will be drawn (section 5). 
2. PROJECT FINANCING AND TAKEOVER COMPENSATION: 
A HELP IN FINANCING HIGHWAY PROJECTS 
The concept of takeover compensation 
In the last years Italy has seen an increasing commitment in infrastructure projects. The 
majority of these projects is included in the so called “Legge Obiettivo” (“Objective law”, L. 
443/01), a sort of national plan for major and strategic infrastructures, that identifies a list of Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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high–priority transportation projects regarding roads, railways and urban system (Brambilla 
and Erba, 2004). Given  the scarcity of governmental funds  risen  in the meantime,  new 
financing mechanisms have been introduced to back these initiatives. Despite unsystematic, 
the  role  mechanisms  such  as  land  value  capture
1, cross modal financing
2  and  PFs with 
“takeover compensation”, has risen. 
Even if the first two are seen as very promising, no significant applications have already 
occurred. For this reason we will focus here only on the last one which has been recently 
adopted in the financial plan of at least six highway projects. The “takeover compensation” 
was introduced in the Italian legislation in 1998 by “Costa – Ciampi” Directive
3; according to 
Paolo  Costa
4  it  was  initially  thought  to  protect  the  agreement  between  the  existing 
concessionaire and the national road agency   and regulator  (ANAS) in the case of new 
investments  required  by  ANAS
5  that,  to  be  repaid,  would  have  exceeded  the  initial 
concession period. The mechanism allows that, at the end of the concession period, the old 
concessionaire  is  granted  by  the  new   one  (selected  through  an  open  tender)  with  a 
compensation  equal to the share   of investment costs not  yet  amortized during the first 
concession period. In other words, the financial and economic plan of the new infrastructure 
can be based on its technical lifetime also if the concession period is shorter. The exceeding 
amortization is then shifted to the incoming concessionaire, that goes on with repayment until 
the end of technical life. 
 
Despite  it  has  been  conceived  for  existing  concessions,  recently  this  tool  has  been 
systematically introduced in the financial plan of several new transport infrastructure projects 
entrusted through PF. In all the cases, the full concession period (from 19,5 to 30 years) is 
shorter than the time needed to amortize the investment, due to feeble profitability. It has 
been evaluated that further increases in toll values or further extension of the concession 
period were not desirable: higher toll may entail an excessive decrease in traffic demand, 
while an extension of the concession period until the end of the infrastructure’s lifetime can 
strengthen monopoly conditions. So, the takeover compensation allows to keep tolls at a 
defined level, comparable to the existing ones, without extending excessively the concession 
period, already very long. The project becomes then feasible and profitable for the private 
investor  since  the  compensation  leads  to  a  cut  in  the  annual  depreciation  funds  of  the 
concessionaire’s income statement. 
The  next  paragraph  will  go  into  details  of  the  application  of  takeover  compensation 
mechanism  in  PF  schemes  instead  of  the  traditional  use  into  existing  concessions.  The 
description will be followed by a comment on the positive and problematic aspects of this 
practice. 
                                                 
1 Applied in the “Quadrilatero” Project for the improvement of the road system of Umbria and Marche Regions. 
2 Applied for financing Brennero Base Tunnel through the allocation of profits generated by the Brennero 
Highway and, in the future, through the application of Eurovignette Directive. 
3 Direttiva Interministeriale 283/98. 
4 Preface to Milotti A., Patumi N. (2008), Il finanziamento delle infrastrutture di trasporto. Enti locali e 
innovazioni, EGEA. 
5 Without the possibility to entrust these new investment to a new concessionaire.  Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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Takeover compensation into project financing 
A Project Financing scheme is based on the capacity of the project to generate cash flow to 
repay the  debts  and to guarantee the private  subject an appropriate return on equity. In 
conventional PFs, the economic and financial plan is structured imputing all the investment to 
the concessionaire and assuming that the concession period is equal to the lifetime of the 
project.  Through  the  application  of  takeover  compensation,  instead,  the  duration  of  the 
concession can be set shorter than the technical lifetime and the amortisation amount is 
lower  than  total  investment  for  the  first  concessionaire.  In  fact,  the  investment  not  yet 
amortised  during  the  period  will  be  paid  by  the  new  concessionaire  via  the  takeover 
compensation. 
It  is  evident  that  this  interpretation  of the  takeover  compensation  is  not  a  “new”  tool  for 
financing  infrastructures trough PF, but rather a financial  “trick”  to extend  the repayment 
period for PFs otherwise financially weak.   
 
A numerical example clarifies how the value of the takeover compensation could be defined 
within  a  standard  financial  plan.  As  said  above  an  appropriate  return  on  equity  is  the 
essential factor to involve private investors, so once this value is defined together with the 
estimated costs and the revenues of the project, it is possible to identify the value of the 
takeover compensation that guarantees both the economic and financial equilibrium of the 
project and the return on the investment for the investors.  
 
The procedure follows an iterative process where the dependent variable is the value of the 
takeover compensation; in fact once the infrastructure costs and the revenues from tolls are 
known,  it  is  possible  to  evaluate  the  residual  non  amortized  investment  equal  to  the 
difference between the total cost, the amortization fund, the public subsidy and the takeover 
compensation value. 
 
It is then possible to define the net income (profit) of the first concessionaire by subtracting 
from the total revenue  the  operating  costs,  the  taxes, the financial costs  and  the  annual 
depreciation; finally the annual value of the ROE is evaluated (Net Income/Shareholder's 
Equity). If the final value of the Internal Rate of Return on equity (IRR) is lower than the one 
agreed with the investors, then a new takeover compensation value is defined and the whole 
iterative process is repeated. The takeover compensation is paid by a new concessionaire 
that is replacing the first one in the following regulatory period. For him the financial plan will 
be  similar,  with  the  cost  of  the  takeover  compensation  among  the  capital  costs  and  the 
residual amortisation fund to be amortised yet. 
The  following  table  presents  an  example  of  takeover  compensation  calculation  for  an 
investment of 10’000 €, without public subsidy (for simplicity’s sake), interest rate on debt of 
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Table 1. Example calculation of takeover compensation. 
 
  10’000.00  Investment  
 
            EQUITY  500.00 
   
 
  DEBT  9’500.00 
 
cost of debt  2’624.67 
  Public subsidy  0.00 
 
takeover comp.   4’774.67 
 
           
 
1  2  3  4  5 
operative revenues  1’000  1’500  2’000  2’000  2’000 
operative costs  100  100  100  100  100 
EBITDA  900  1’400  1’900  1’900  1’900 
depreciation fund  -  1’570.00  3’140,00  4’710.00  6’280.00 
residual value  7’850.00  6’280.00  4’710,00  3’140.00  1’570.00 
yearly depreciation  1’570.00  1’570.00  1’570,00  1’570.00  1’570.00 
taxes  0  0  0  0  0 
profit  - 670.00  - 170.00  330.00  330.00  330.00 
ROE  - 134.00%  - 34.00%  66.00%  66.00%  66.00% 
           
       
Total profits  150.00 
       
TIR on Equity  6.00% 
 
The example shows that the investment, even if the cash flow is clearly insufficient in the 5 
years period, is financially sustainable for the private investor that earns a 6% on equity 
thanks to the 4’774€ takeover compensation at year 5, reducing the yearly amortisation. The 
same result could have been achieved with a public subsidy at the first year of 3.741€, if 
available. 
Benefits of the takeover compensation for new infrastructures 
The use of takeover compensation in PFs presents some benefits (Milotti, 2008) that justify 
its application, similarly to those of the original form used in the traditional concessions (as 
allowed, in Italy, by the “Costa-Ciampi” decree). 
Firstly,  its  effect  is  beneficial  for  the  P&L  account  of  the  concessionaire,  allowing  a 
substantial  reduction  of  the  amortization  needed  every  year  and  simply  making  feasible 
investments otherwise not financially sustainable. 
From the public and regulator’s viewpoint, it shortens concession  periods, allowing more 
frequent  tenders  for  concession  renewals.  Shorter  concession  periods  means  more 
contestability, more competition and finally more pressure for efficiency in the management 
and exploitation of natural monopolies. 
The need for lump sum public subsidy is reduced. Theoretically, an appropriate takeover 
compensation  can  determines  investments  at  zero  cost  for  the  Treasury.  From  another 
perspective, it allows the cost coverage of an infrastructure without expanding tolls above an 
unsustainable level or without extending indefinitely the concession period. 
It  is  also  possible  to  include  in  the  concession  contract  mechanisms  guaranteeing  the 
conceding  body  from  concessionaire’s  underinvestment:  in  this  case  the  takeover Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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compensation  will  be  reduced,  incentivising  the  concessionaire  to  make  the  needed 
maintenance for keeping infrastructure’s value constant. 
Finally, it is possible to skim concessionaire’s extra profits generated by unexpected traffic 
increases, by reducing the takeover compensation. This fact, in general, allows to reduce 
concessionaire’s  opportunistic  behaviours  aimed  at  capitalising  as  profit  the  information 
asymmetries on demand. 
All the elements here briefly discussed and supporting the application of the tool, seem to 
suggest the widest use of takeover compensation, capable of reducing public expenditure, 
guaranteeing  profits  regulation  and  making  financially  stronger  investment  projects. 
However, as will be shown in the following, numerous drawbacks exist and must be carefully 
considered when designing the contracts.  
Drawbacks and problems 
Even if apparently excellent, the  inappropriate use of takeover compensation tool in new 
infrastructures PFs presents some severe problems. Such drawbacks are partially theoretical 
and partially due to the Italian application. 
The first one is theoretical. The prevision of an appropriate amount of takeover compensation 
allows almost every project to be financially sustainable
6, even if the cash flow is absolutely 
insufficient  to  naturally  f inance  the  scheme .  For  example,  g oing  back  to  the  fictitious 
calculations above, a takeover compensation equal to the exact amount of the investment 
plus the cost of debt needs only 30€ per year of EBITDA to remunerate the hypothesised 
equity of 500€. No amortisation will be done and the amount of the investment will be simply 
transferred  to  the  second  concessionaire  as  it  is.  This  fact  implies  that  even  transport 
infrastructure  with no traffic and extremely costly can be made  financially  sustainable  by 
simply calculating an appropriate compensation to be paid to the first concessionaire by the 
second one
7. As a consequence, any useless infrastructure could be built. The “solution” to 
this problem is twofold. Firstly, an independent planner should evaluate the projects, both 
from the financial and economic viewpoint. Secondly, in theory no reasonable investor would 
risk to invest its money if at the end nobody will reasonably pay the compensation in order to 
become the concessionaire of a useless infrastructure. However this apparently absurd case 
is possible in Italy, as will be commented below. 
The second problem is related to the first one. The mechanism allows to postpone a public 
investment indefinitely, by hiding it behind a PPP. If a project is not profitable, a private 
investor is willing to anticipate the needed money (in form of debt or equity), only if there is a 
sure return. The takeover compensation is used to grant such return. The consequence is, 
however, that the PPP simply becomes a costly loan from a private subject to the state. 
The  third  point  is  especially  related  to  Italian  normative  and  makes  the  previous  two 
otherwise  absurd  points  possible.  If,  at  the  end  of  the  concession,  no  new  subject  is 
interested in paying the compensation in order to become the new concessionaire of the 
infrastructure, the law foresees an explicit guarantee for the first concessionaire to have the 
                                                 
6 With the exclusion of specific norms on bankruptcy in case of insufficient cash flows. 
7 It is worth noticing that this is not at all a theoretical problem only: the Italian project of the Tirrenica highway 
(discussed also below) is expected to need a takeover compensation very near to the initia l investment (both 
~3.8 M€). This simply means that 30 years of revenues are sufficient to cover nearly the running costs. Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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amount  paid  anyway.  The  guarantee  fund  (Fondo  Centrale  di  Garanzia  per  le  Opere 
Pubbliche – FGOP) is held by the “Cassa Depositi e Prestiti” (hereafter CdP), a joint – stock 
company under public control managing the capital collected by postal saving accounts. At 
the  moment  there  is  a  strong  debate  between  concessionaires  and  CdP  about  the 
application of the FGOP. In fact, the CdP requires the fulfilment of strong criteria regarding 
the economic and financial viability of the project (regarding in particularly cash flow after the 
concession period, costs, etc) and the creditworthiness both of the concessionaire and of the 
grantor.  These  conditions  are  however  too  strict  for  the  concessionaires.  Whereas  the 
guarantee is not applied, there is also the possibility that once the concession has expired 
the public grantor pays the takeover compensation value to the concessionaire, becoming 
the  new  highway  operator.  In  confirmation  of  the  distorted  application  of  takeover 
compensation tool and of the risk for the public expenditure, we report here the words
8 of 
Paolo Costa, co-author of the Directive that introduced takeover compensation in the Italian 
normative: 
“The most recent idea assumes the use of takeover compensation as an 
element already in the initial concession agreement, during the selection 
of  the  first  concessionaire.  This  fact  implies,  de  facto,  ex  post  public 
subsidy  (since  at  the  end  of  the  concession  period,  the  grantor  is  not 
obliged to award the concession to a new operator). This approach, is, 
financially  speaking,  an  ingenious  (creative?)  way  to  postpone  in  the 
future the possible public expenditure.” 
 
3. EXPLOITING DEMAND RIGIDITY: A TRICK FOR 
FINANCING HIGHWAY PROJECTS 
From free to tolled roads 
The demand for highway transportation represents the outcome of the value that consumers 
place on traveling in a particular time, manner, and place, as measured by their willingness 
to “pay” for a trip (FHWA, 2009). 
Demand  levels  may  vary  according  to  many  variables  that  range  from  socioeconomic 
conditions,  operating  costs  (fuel  price,  oil  and  maintenance),  tolls  value,  travel  time, 
congestion level to more subjective parameters like income levels, comfort and convenience, 
etc.  Travel  demand  elasticity  represents  the  variation  in  quantity  of  travel  demanded  to 
changes  in  the  perceived  price  of  travel.  One  of the main  variable  affecting the  level  of 
demand is the presence of transport alternatives and their costs to the users.  
Moreover,  the  elasticity  is  not  constant  according  to  timeframe  being  considered;  in  fact 
researches showed (Burris, 2003; Matas and Raymond, 2003; Odeck and Bråthen, 2007) 
that demand is typically less elastic in the short run than in the long run. This statement is 
intuitively obvious since travelers do not change their behavior soon after the increase in 
                                                 
8 Our translation from the preface to Milotti and Patumi (2008). Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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price  of  travel,  but  the  effect  increases  over  time.  For  example,  their  housing  and 
employment  locations  are  likely  to  remain  fixed  initially.  To  the  contrary,  in  the  long  run 
travelers may adapt to the new context both changing their transport behavior (looking for 
cheaper alternatives or other transport modes) or moving closer to their work. 
 
As said above, the elasticity of demand depends also by the quality and availability of close 
substitutes. In fact, for example, if free alternative road or cheaper public alternative serve 
the area, travelers are likely to readily switch from the tolled highway to the more convenient 
alternatives resulting in high-demand elasticity. Conversely, if there are no good substitutes, 
travelers might accept to pay a higher price or find another solution (change job, move closer 
to  the  place  they  work),  in  which  case  demand  is  likely  to  be  inelastic.  Such  rigidity, 
especially in the short run, benefits the concessionaire of monopoly rents (Debande, 2002). 
 
In the next paragraph we will shortly present the case of an highway project in which demand 
is artificially made inelastic through the downgrading of the existing free alternative road. The 
resulting increased willingness to pay of users (that do not have any realistic alternative) is 
exploited to finance the investment. 
A12 Highway – Tirrenica 
Tirrenica  highway  project  will  connect  Civitavecchia  in  Lazio  and  Rosignano  in  Tuscany, 
linking,  in  general,  Genoa  to  Rome.  At  the  moment  the  highway  (A12)  consists  of  few 
kilometers in Tuscany and in Lazio while the remaining connection is represented by a non 
tolled motorway, called “Variante Aurelia”, between Rosignano and Grosseto, and a national 
road between Grosseto and Civitavecchia, called “Aurelia”.  
 
 
Figure 2. Livorno Civitavecchia connection. 
In 2000 the national road agency (ANAS) proposed a project for the upgrading of both the 
“Variante  Aurelia”  and  the  old  “Aurelia”  road  (that  at  the  moment  presents  a  non 
homogenous  road  system  with  short  links  with  only  two  lanes  and  some  grade  level 
intersections which entail high accident rate). The cost of that project was around 870 M€. 
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This project was abandoned in favour of a heavier solution. The new project (206 km) will 
extend the existing A12 regional motorway through the upgrading of the “Variante Aurelia” 
and  the  construction  of  a  brand  new  highway  that  will  substitute  the  old  “Aurelia”.  The 
“Aurelia” will be downgraded to a “park road” (according to DM 5/11/2001) with only one lane 
for each direction, bicycle path and a series of roundabouts. 
The new project will cost around 3’800 M€ and it will be realized in project financing by SAT, 
a subsidiary of the biggest highway operator in Italy ASPI. 
 
          
 
Figure 3. Italian North-South highway links. 
The most problematic aspect of this project concerns the decision to downgrade the Aurelia 
route to a road park: if it may seem reasonable that, once a better infrastructure will be 
available for the heavy and fast traffic, the older  infrastructure is re-designed in order to 
better deal with light and slow mobility (including bicycle lanes). However this decision seems 
not  to be taken for these  “environmental  and quality  reasons”  and  will  actually  force the 
motorists  (especially  those  moving  on  short-medium  distances  with  no  cheaper  route  or 
modal alternative) to use the new tolled highway link.  
The financial viability of the A12 seems to derive mainly from the choice to downgrade the 
old Aurelia: the removal of any realistic free alternative route entails that demand elasticity is 
made  artificially  rigid.  In  fact,  since  the  cost  of  using  this  road  or  the  costs  of  modal 
alternatives (travel cost, ticket cost, cost to reach the station or bus stop, etc) will be much 
higher than the toll rate on the new highway, travelers might accept to pay a higher price or 
find another solution (change job, move closer to the place they work)
9.  
 
                                                 
9 There will be two different types of users interested by the project, those for short distance and those for 
long distance (e.g. North - South connection). The latter will use the new highway only if the toll imposed will 
be  competitive  compared  to  the  longer  highway  alternatives  (A1  and  A14  highways).  The  users  for  short 
distance,  in  absence  of  any  comparable  modal  alternatives,  will  be  forced  to  use  and  pay  for  the  new 
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The outcome is that the scheme seems to increase socio-economic costs and not reducing 
it, given the absence of congestion on the existing non-tolled motorway. 
Moreover, if we take into account the actual traffic volume
10 we may say that even with the 
downgrading of the old alternative there will be low traffic revenues to justify the investment, 
for this reason the financial and economic plan of A12 foresees  the extension of the  
concession period from 2028 to 2046
11, the introduction of takeover compensation tool that 
will cover most part of the investment
12  and a significant increase in the toll rate value  
(annually increase of 5.8% in real term from 2011 to 2017 and 0.5% from 2018 to 2046
13). 
 
The last  consideration  regards the  construction phase. The majority of work  for the new 
highway (60% of the total construction work) will be realized in house by Pavimental SpA
14, 
subsidiary of ASPI itself which also controls the concessionaire SAT. Since the concession 
was awarded without a  sound competitive procedure
15, this contradicts the common sense 
and the regulatory theory: to avoid this kind of conflict of interest  it would be necessary to 
introduce ex post competition in the construction phase in order to ensure transparency and 
efficiency. 
4. CONCESSIONAIRE DIMENSION AND INVESTMENT  
Italian highways framework 
Italian  highway  system  consists  of  approximately  6’500  km,  the  majority  of  which  is 
franchised. Part of this network, 600 km, has characteristics of highway, but is built and 
owned by the national road agency ANAS. The concessionaires are 24, usually privately 
owned or mixed public-private (Beria, 2009).  
The majority of concessionaires are small operators owned by local authorities or by minor 
private shareholders (Ragazzi, 2008). The two main private groups instead, SIAS Group and 
Atlantia Group, control most part of the network. SIAS holding, controlled by Gavio Group, 
through its subsidiaries manages about 20% of the network mostly in the north-west of Italy. 
The holding company Atlantia SpA, controlled by Benetton family, has the full control of the 
sub-holding    “Autostrade  per  l’Italia  SpA”  (hereafter  “ASPI”),  Italy’s  largest  toll  motorway 
builder and operator with 2’854.6
16 km of network under concession that  serves the 67% of 
                                                 
10 The maximum traffic volume reached is currently nearly 20.000 bidirectional equivalent vehicles per day 
(SAT, Studio di Impatto Ambientale - Sintesi non tecnica, Giugno 2005). 
11  In October 2009 the  infringement proceeding  opened by EU Commission against the extension of the 
concession period has been closed in favour of the concessionaire (for further details see   Edilizia e Territorio, 
12 Ottobre 2009).  
12 Rumors from the press indicate that the takeover compensation value will nearly equal the total investment 
cost for the infrastructure (La Nazione, 15 Aprile 2010). 
13 Edilizia e Territorio, 23-28 Marzo 2009. 
14 The shares of Pavimental are held by the two biggest motorways holding groups in Italy, ASPI - Autostrade 
per l’Italia SpA  (71.67%)  and Gruppo Gavio (25.86%). Source: Pavimental website consulted on April 20, 2010.  
15 see Ragazzi,2008. 
16 Atlantia SpA webpage. Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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the  Italian  traffic
17.  The  total  network  attributable  to  Atlantia  SpA ,  including  also  other 
controlled highways, accounts for 3’413 km and it is used by approximately 4 million people 
every day (see Figure ). 
 
 
Figure 4. Highway Concession Framework in Italy 
As can be seen in Figure 4, an important difference between those two groups is related with 
their  structure  (Greco,  2004).  ASPI  directly  controls  17  concessions  (all  included  in  one 
single Agreement between ANAS and ASPI) and indirectly the concessions of 7 subsidiaries 
(each one signed a specific agreement with ANAS).  
SIAS, to the contrary, controls 8 different sub-companies each one ruled by an Agreement. 
However, none of them has a network which is much longer that the others (Greco, 2004).  
This  situation  of  both  fragmentation  and  concentration  is  not  justified  by  any  economic 
consideration. For example, two successive links of the highway A5 are under two different 
operators, presently owned by the same group (Ativa SpA and SAV SpA, both by SIAS), but 
ruled  by  two  different  contracts.  There  is  clearly  no  rationale  of  such  division,  rather 
depending only by the history of ownership relationships of concessions. One can suggest to 
verify the scale of the economies of scale of the whole Italian highway sector, since present 
situation absurdly ranges from the 2500 km of ASPI to less than 67 km of half of the A5 
motorway (SAV concession). 
Network dimension and investment 
The toll definition system for ASPI is defined by the Agreement signed between ANAS and 
ASPI in 2007 and approved by the Law 101/2008; toll charges increases will be equal to the 
                                                 
17 The importance of the ASPI network is summarised by two figures: its network develops in an area hosting 
83% of the Italian population and accounting for the 87% of the GDP (source: ASPI concession contract).  Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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70% of the real inflation value (in the previous 12 months) plus specific tariff components for 
work performed that were not included in the original 1997 agreement (X)
18 and for  new  
investments
19(K).  The  value  of  X  is  defined  considering  the  works  realized  by  the 
concessionaire and the traffic volume on the total network (plus the one generated by the 
new investment). This formula was originally a sort of price -cap, but any aspect related to 
efficiency has disappeared with the law quoted above (Beria and Ponti, 2009). 
 
Given  this  toll  revision  formula,  t he  different  dimension  and  structure  of  the  highway 
operators entail important financial effect. In fact, it is possible for a large network operator to 
finance  nearly  any type of investment  (in absence of a public and independent socio -
economic assessment) since the cost can spread on the entire network. The investment is 
then paid even by the users that will not have any benefit from the new asset.  
In confirmation of this statement, we report here the words of Giovanni Castellucci, CEO of 
Atlantia SpA, that speaking of a new  investment (Gronda di Ponente project) just started in 
Region Liguria said:  
“…the  project  is  financially  viable,  toll  increases  on  the  whole  national 
network (of ASPI) for the next ten years have been already scheduled”
20  
This situation is not a problem per se (it can be reasonable that users benefited in the past 
by investments, pay for the new users of the marginal network), but because of the different 
dimensions of the concessions. In fact, the two large concessionaires are able to issue a 
sustainable financial plan for virtually any improvement or extension, while small ones can 
afford only marginal upgrades or need substantial state subsidies or takeover compensation 
(as described above). This entails problems of equity among the users of the network but it 
also  requires  some  considerations  about  the  minimum  efficient  dimension  of  the 
concessionaire since this approach could theoretically make financially feasible any kind of 
project. 
A further  critical issue  is caused by the fact that  large operators  indirectly controls other 
smaller licensees. When their networks are too small to generate enough traffic to repay new 
investment, it is possible that they apply to obtain subsidies from the State. In this case, very 
frequent, the main Group avoids to self-finance the extensions, even if perfectly capable to 
do it with the profits coming from its other companies (Ragazzi, 2004). 
As already pointed out by Ragazzi (2004) the cost of new investments to be reflected in 
tariffs  is  generally  negotiated  ex  ante  between  the  regulatory  authority  and  the 
concessionaire. Since most of the new investments (mainly proposed by the concessionaire 
itself in order to justify the extension of the concession period) do not foresee any tender 
mechanism,  there  is  the  risk  that  concessionaires  realize  the  investments  through  their 




                                                 
18 Atlantia, Financial Statements 2008 – Annual Report.  
19 Not included in the financial plan before 3th October 2006 (source: ASPI concession contract). 
20 Il Secolo XIX Genova, 10th February 2010, pp. 18 -19. Financing transport infrastructure projects in Italy: a critical analysis of the main approaches 
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In a context of public budget constraints and high public debt levels, governments are less 
and less able to finance investments in the transport sector that could generate benefits for 
the society. The introduction of new instruments for financing such investments is commonly 
recognised to be an important help to invert the trend by providing private capitals. Public-
private  partnerships,  and  project  finance  in  particular,  can  also  represent  a  way  for 
governments to take advantage of the capacity of the private sector to increase efficiency. 
Nevertheless,  this  paper  stresses  that  the  effectiveness  and  general  appropriateness  of 
those instruments is strictly related  to the rules adopted and to the roles of the involved 
stakeholders. 
Three critical aspects associated to these instruments have been analysed, with respect to 
the highway sectors (but the same consideration may well be extended to other transport 
modes) and starting from the analysis of some Italian cases: 
1.  The use of a “takeover compensation” at the end of the concession period on the one 
hand  allows  shorter  concession  periods  (improving  contestability  and  potentially 
efficiency). However, on the other hand, makes theoretically any project feasible even 
if the cash flow is absolutely insufficient to naturally finance the scheme; 
2.  The exploitation of the demand rigidity to stress the financial viability of projects with 
scarce  or  no  benefits  by  means  of  higher  tariffs,  may  generate  important  social 
welfare losses; 
3.  The  existence  of  concessionaires  with  different  network  extension  introduce 
distortions under price-cap rules as the current Italian ones. In particular, the same 
scheme can be feasible if the concessionaire network is large (a small toll increase is 
spread  on  the  entire  network)  and  not  feasible  for  smaller  concessionaires  (toll 
increase  would  be  excessively  high  and  mining  demand).  This  is  clearly 
counterintuitive from a socio-economic viewpoint, because for a scheme should be 
evaluated the need for public investment independently from concessionaire size.  
The  analysis  of  those  problems  seem  to  strengthen  some  common  indications  of  the 
economic regulation theory: 
  An independent appraisal of the utility of projects, based on socio-economical cost-
benefit analysis, is important even when they seem to be capable of paying back the 
investment with tariffs; 
  An independent regulation Authority seems to be indispensable in order to  introduce 
a third part in the relationships between the government and the private stakeholders 
and thus reduce capture risks. 
In particular, Italian experience suggests that new tools for financing transport infrastructures 
may apparently be useful and fair. However the scarce transparency, the existence of rules 
powerfully  distorting  the  process  and  the  lack  of  consistent  independent  cost-benefit 
analysis, contribute to make feasible even absurd projects and stimulate overinvestment. 
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